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ENERGY POLICY 
IN THE NAFTA 
Andrew R. Laudenslager 
Overview 
The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) will combine three major pow-
ers of the world's energy market into one eco-
nomic unit. These three, Canada, Mexico and 
the U.S., will lower their trade barriers in an 
effort to improve economic development. 
Currently, Mexico's constitution contains 
significant barriers to foreign investment in 
Mexico's energy sector. The NAFTA will remove 
some of these barriers, creating opportunities 
for increased trade, especially with the U.S. 
Because Canada and the U.S. already have a free 
trade agreement, and because the distance 
between Canada and Mexico makes trade of 
energy and energy products unfeasible at this 
time, Canada is the least affected by the NAFTA. 
The energy sector includes the explo-
ration, exploitation, refining, and distribution 
of natural resources used to produce energy. It 
includes the generation and distribution of elec-
tricity and a large portion of petrochemicals. 
The energy products most affected by the 
NAFTA include electricity, natural gas, petrole-
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urn and its derivatives. There is little trade in 
electricity produced by coal, nuclear, wind and 
hydro power in the trilateral area; therefore, 
these energy sources do not mandate signifi-
cant attention. For example, in Mexico the sum 
of coal, hydroelectric, geothermal, firewood and 
sugarcane power accounts for less than ten per-
cent of total energy production. (Annual 
Petroleum Report, p. 27) Nuclear energy is also 
a small source in Mexico. However, under the 
provisions of the NAFTA, all aspects of nuclear 
energy in Mexico are subject to the complete 
control of the Mexican government. As a result, 
trade in nuclear energy technology (a "strate-
gic activity," according to the NAFTA text) will 
appear only under the exceptions of the NAFTA. 
What is important is who extracts and process-
es the hydrocarbon natural resources and who 
distributes and receives them. 
Because Mexico's political history plays 
such a significant role in the negotiations of the 
NAFTA, I will examine this subject first. I will 
then follow with a discussion of each of the 
important energy industries that will be affect-
ed by the agreement. 
Mexico's History and Its Role in the 
Negotiations 
Historically, Mexico has viewed oil as an 
"inalienable" natural resource; its ownership 
and exploitation are a source of national pride. 
This nationalistic sentiment has hindered 
attempts to open Mexico's petroleum industry 
to direct foreign investment which in turn 
delayed completion of the NAFTA text. 
In Mexico's 1917 Constitution, Article 27 
reserves the subsoil rights exclusively for 
Mexican citizens. However, between 1917 and 
1938 these constitutional provisions were min-
imally enforced. Consequently, when foreign 
ownership became an issue in the 1920s and 
1930s, it was unclear whether the Constitution 
required confiscation of foreign property or 
whether firms established in Mexico prior to 
1917 could continue to operate. In fact , 
American, British, and Dutch oil companies 
actually increased their investments in Mexico 
in the 1920s and transformed the country into 
a major oil producer and exporter. (Hufbauer 
and Schott, p. 187) Conflicts over the subsoil 
rights and labor issues strained relations 
between the Mexican government and the for-
eign oil companies (mostly U.S. and British) on 
a continuing basis. The Mexican government 
insisted on many changes in the foreign com-
panies' operations. For example, in 1931 Mexico 
enacted a labor code that required that ninety 
percent of all foreign oil companies' employees 
be Mexican, that Mexicans be trained to replace 
foreign technicians, and that unions be allowed 
to inspect the accounts of any commercial 
enterprise. (Riding, p. 159) Mter court appeals 
and considerable debate between the foreign oil 
companies and the Mexican government, on 
March 18, 1938, President Lazaro Cardenas 
expropriated all seventeen of the American and 
British oil companies for their "arrogant and 
rebellious attitude." (Riding, p. 160) Relations 
between Mexico and Britain and the U.S. were 
strained until World War II when an agreement 
settled the expropriations with payments to the 
affected companies, although the payments did 
not dispel fears of Great Britain and the U.S. re-
investing in Mexico nor did the settlement 
reduce the degree to which Mexicans covet their 
oil. The nationalistic feeling for oil remains 
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strong, and Mexican citizens still celebrate the 
anniversary of the expropriation of the oil indus-
try as a "day of national dignity." (Hufbauer and 
Schott, p. 188) 
The chief purpose of the Mexican petrole-
um industry until 1976 was to achieve energy 
self-sufficiency for the country. To this end, 
Petr6leos Mexicanos, or Pemex, was established 
on June 7, 1938. Although it started with out-
dated machinery from the expropriations, after 
one year production was nearly up to the levels 
the foreign companies had achieved. Pemex's 
prominence in the world market was not note-
worthy, however, until the 1976 discovery of a 
major oil field in the Bay of Campeche. By its size 
alone, this huge field helped Pemex to become a 
world class oil company. (Riding, p. 165) 
In addition to increasing Pemex's revenue, 
the Campeche field discovery gave hope of 
world economic prominence to Mexico. 
Anticipating the exploitation of its newly found 
petroleum reserves, Mexico borrowed heavily 
from foreign sources to finance economic 
development. Between 1976 and 1980, Mexico's 
petroleum production nearly tripled from less 
than one million barrels per day to 2.7 million 
barrels per day. However, the government spent 
the oil boom revenues of the late 1970s unwise-
ly and, instead of improving its economic state, 
created a massive debt. Then in 1982 falling oil 
prices, coupled with the debt crisis, caused the 
oil industry to lose much government backing. 
Because the oil market fluctuates so much, 
Mexico has sought to diversify its economy so 
that it does not rely solely on oil. 
To make up for waning support from the 
government, in 1989 Pemex created Petr6leos 
Mexicanos International (PM I) as the market-
ing agent for its crude and refined oil products. 
PMI has greatly increased the efficiency of 
Pemex, saving over sixty million dollars per 
year. Much of this gain has come from chang-
ing Pemex's supply strategy. In the past it 
shipped domestic products produced in the Gulf 
of Mexico to the Pacific coast. Today, Pemex 
sells surplus products produced in the Gulf of 
Mexico to external buyers and buys products 
needed on the Pacific coast from outside 
sources. (Annual Petroleum Report, p. 18) 
This supply strategy saves considerable trans-
portation costs. 
Despite its decrease in funding to the 
petrochemical industry, Mexico has initiated 
new policies for creating a more efficient and 
ecologically sound energy industry. For exam-
ple, in 1988 Pemex began changing its fleet of 
tanker trucks to load from the bottom rather 
than the top. Pemex estimates that this modi-
fication saves at least three percent of each load 
of gasoline which was formerly lost to evapora-
tion. (Annual Petroleum Report, p. 17) As a 
move toward environmental responsibility, on 
March 18, 1991, President Salinas ordered the 
closure of a refinery to reduce air pollution in 
Mexico City. This unprecedented closure was 
probably the first closing in the world of a refin-
ery for ecological purposes. (Annual Petroleum 
Report, p. 10) 
In the wake of the April1992 gas line explo-
sion disaster in Guadalajara, President Salinas 
restructured Pemex in an effort to increase safe-
ty and efficiency. He subdivided Pemex into four 
independent companies and retained Pemex as 
the parent company. The subsidiaries are Pemex 
Exploration and Production, Pemex Refining, 
Pemex Gas and Basic Petrochemical, and Pemex 
Petrochemical. Mexico prohibits private invest-
ment in the first three because they are closely 
related to crude petroleum, but encourages it in 
Pemex Petrochemical which uses derivatives of 
crude oil. 
As part of its restructuring, Pemex fired 
and laid off many of its employees despite their 
being members of the Petroleum Workers 
Union. Professor Sebastian Guzman, the 
Secretary General of the Petroleum Workers 
Union, continues to support the drastic person-
nel reductions at Pemex in an effort to sustain 
the company. However, these reductions have 
caused angry protests and marches. While vis-
iting Mexico City in August 1992, I witnessed a 
protest in Mexico City's z6calo, or center square, 
by hundreds of Pemex workers, furious at being 
fired. In an effort to improve living conditions 
for the remaining employees, Pemex has 
pledged to build 5,000 houses for its employees 
each year during the Salinas sexenio, or six year 
presidential term, in order to alleviate the prob-
lems of sub-standard housing and workers hav-
ing to live at great distances from their families. 
(Annual Petroleum Report, p. 13) 
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The NAFTA and the Electricity 
Industry 
The U.S. and Canada have efficient and 
effective electricity-producing industries and 
have been trading partners in electricity for 
many years. During the 1980s, Canada export-
ed, on average, eight times as much electricity 
per year to the U.S. as the U.S. exported to 
Canada. (Hufbauer and Schott, p. 202) The 
implementation of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) equalized and eliminated tar-
iffs and consequently caused a drastic change 
in the balance of trade. Canada's imports from 
the U.S. have increased while its exports to the 
U.S. have decreased drastically. In 1990, net 
electricity exported from Canada to the U.S. was 
619 million kilowatt-hours in comparison to 
33,091 million kilowatt hours in 1981. 
Although the FTA has created a shift in the vol-
ume of energy trade between Canada and the 
U.S., it is not uncommon for large fluctuations 
in the net trade deficit. Much of Canada's gen-
erating capacity is hydro-electric; and in the 
event of a dry year, Canada's energy production 
drops significantly. Thus, though the FTA has 
had an impact, the magnitude of its effects is 
not totally clear because of the dependence of 
the Canadian power supply on the weather. 
Although electricity trade between the 
U.S. and Canada is well established, neither fed-
eral government regulates imports and the 
physical interconnections of electricity; how-
ever, both do regulate exports. State and 
provincial governments regulate imports and 
interconnections. The U.S. federal govern-
ment's Economic Regulatory Administration 
and Canada's National Energy Board are the 
agencies charged with export regulation. 
Although the FTA eliminated some of the bar-
riers, the lack of unity created by the state and 
provincial regulation of electricity still impedes 
the electricity trade. In contrast, Mexico's inter-
national trade and interconnections are both 
regulated by the Comisi6n Federal de 
Electricidad (CFE). Furthermore, Mexico 's 
industry is entirely government owned and 
operated. Even though people in areas as devel-
oped as Mexico City complain that the electric-
ity supply is not consistent, today Mexico is a 
net exporter of electricity. In 1981, Mexico had 
a trade deficit of 186 million kilowatt-hours, but 
by 1990 the deficit turned into a surplus of 
1,951 million kilowatt-hours. 
Electricity trade between the U.S. and 
Mexico increased significantly since the 1987 
signing of a 220-megawatt power purchase 
agreement between the CFE and local 
California utilities. This trend of increasing 
trade will continue with the NAFTA. The elec-
tricity industry in the U.S. wants Mexico to 
loosen its investment barriers on the electrici-
ty sector. If the NAFTA becomes a reality, 
Mexico will allow private foreign investors to 
own electric generating plants for their use or 
to sell power back to Mexico. (Mexico: Foreign 
Investment Report, p. 40) Besides creating the 
opportunities for investments, the NAFTA 
negotiations could promote greater liberaliza-
tion of trade in electricity. This liberalization 
would yield the economic and technical bene-
fits of cheaper energy costs for consumers along 
with increased integrity and reliability of the 
system. As demand for electricity increases in 
Mexico, the quality of its electrical infrastruc-
ture will have to improve. It will need to 
achieve compatibility with that of the U.S. for 
efficient trans-border transmission. Compati-
bility, as well as geographical proximity ( espe-
cially near the border), will significantly reduce 
transmission costs to consumers by allowing 
them to buy electricity from a plant that, 
though located in an other country, is closer. 
Trade, which balances out the peaks and valleys 
of supply and demand, will also defer construc-
tion of new power plants in both the U.S. and 
Mexico, thereby reducing both the costs to con-
sumers and the negative effects to the environ-
ment. (Hufbauer and Schott, p. 202-3) 
The NAFTA will not affect Canada's rela-
tionship with either the U.S. or Mexico. 
Canada's interest in trading electricity with 
Mexico is minimal because of the distance 
between the two countries. The real possibili-
ties for change will be a result of the liberaliza-
tion of the electricity sector by the Mexican gov-
ernment. In anticipation of a turnaround in the 
availability of electricity and increased restric-
tions in pollution controls, Ford is planning to 
release an electric car in Mexico within the next 
ten years. (Ford Motor Company, 1992) 
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Natural Gas Crossing Borders 
Today, all three members of the trilateral 
trading area are leaders in natural gas reserves 
and production. Both the U.S. and Canada have 
extensive natural gas reserves and technology. 
As of January 1, 1990, the U.S. had an estimat-
ed 165 trillion cubic feet in reserves and a pro-
duction capacity of 18 trillion cubic feet. 
Mexico ranks as the eighth or ninth largest pro-
ducer of natural gas in the world. (Annual 
Petroleum Report, p. 24) Mexico's reserves are 
73.4 trillion cubic feet with the production 
capacity of 1.28 trillion cubic feet in 1989. 
The restructuring of Pemex delegates the 
responsibility for natural gas exploration and 
exploitation to Pemex Exploration and 
Exploitation. Pemex Gas and Petrochemical 
will process the natural gas. Both of these sub-
sidiaries are completely closed to foreign invest-
ment. Historically, Canada too has restricted 
all foreign investment in its energy sector. But 
as a result of the FTA, Canada has established a 
method of review for the foreign takeover of 
Canadian firms. The foreign-owned firms par-
ticipate in the oil and gas industry on the same 
terms as Canadian-owned companies, except in 
the frontier regions, where fifty percent 
Canadian ownership is required to get a pro-
duction license. (Hufbauer and Schott, p. 206) 
Unlike its neighbors, the U.S. has no restric-
tions on foreign investment. The U.S.-Canada 
FTA prohibits the use of minimum price 
requirements as well as taxes on exports, unless 
the tax is also levied on sales for the domestic 
market. These policies effectively curtail a gov-
ernment's ability to enforce price discrimina-
tion in favor of domestic producers. The result 
is a market-set pricing scheme based on com-
mercial instead of political constraints. In early 
1991, Mexico's pricing regime changed from a 
two-tier structure (one price for domestic users 
that is substantially below the export market 
selling price) to a market-based price. Pemex 
uses the import price at the U.S. border plus 
additional transportation costs to set the con-
sumer price. (Annual Petroleum Report, p. 25) 
Trading natural gas in the trilateral region 
has been extensive. In 1980, the U.S. imported 
nearly 800,000 million cubic feet (mcf) from 
Canada, and in 1990 that figure nearly doubled. 
Because of geographical advantages, U.S. 
exports to Canada have increased concurrent-
ly. In 1980 Canada imported just over 100 mcf, 
and, after a peak of 38,448 mcf in 1989, the vol-
ume leveled out to 17,359 mcf in 1990. Despite 
its capacity to produce natural gas, Mexico has 
been a net importer since 1985 because of 
growing needs and insufficient production and 
distribution capabilities. The U.S. supplies 
nearly 90 percent of Mexico's imports of natur-
al gas, and demand has been increasing steadi-
ly. (USITC 23S3, p. 4-30) 
The main reason for Mexico's lagging nat-
ural gas development has been a lack of invest-
ment capital. During the 1970s when Mexico's 
oil industry was expanding rapidly, as much as 
26.1 percent of the natural gas associated with 
crude oil extraction was flared. Like many devel-
oping countries, Mexico focused its efforts on 
oil and considered associated natural gas a by-
product not worth the investment in the infra-
structure required to collect it. Today, Mexico 
flares only three percent of its gas, but still the 
natural gas industry lacks capital. (Annual 
Petroleum Report, p. 25) The negative shift in 
financial support associated with the financial 
crisis of 1982 is shown by the changes in explo-
ration. In 1982 Mexico drilled fifty-six new gas 
wells and in 1989 only six. (Hufbauer and 
Schott, p. 200) In an effort to reduce pollution, 
President Salinas announced in early 1992 that 
Mexico City's 170,000 small buses would be con-
verted to use natural gas instead of gasoline. 
Currently, the conversions have been to liquid 
petroleum gas (LPG), a derivative of natural gas 
that has been used in Mexico City as cooking 
fuel. As public transportation converts from 
diesel and gasoline to natural gas or LPG, the 
demand for natural gas will increase. 
To satisfy its increasing demand for nat-
ural gas, Mexico will increase its imports. On 
August 1, 1992, the Valero Natural Gas 
Company began operating its new pipeline bor-
der crossing near Reynosa. Another company, 
Houston Pipeline, a subsidiary of Enron, has 
petitioned the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Board for another border crossing in the 
Reynosa area. With the Enron crossing and an 
increase in El Paso's crossing capacity, over one 
billion cubic feet per day export capacity of nat-
ural gas will move from the U.S. to Mexico. 
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The U.S.-Canada agreement on natural gas 
is set by the FTA and will not be affected by the 
NAFTA. Canada's natural gas industry will not 
be involved with Mexico because of the lack of 
infrastructure in the form of pipelines con-
necting Canada and Mexico. Canada's long-
term exportation goals include pipelines as far 
south as Philadelphia and San Diego, however. 
U.S. trade with Mexico is currently increasing 
and will continue to grow even without the 
NAFTA because today natural gas enters Mexico 
duty free from the U.S. (USITC 2353, p. 4-30) 
Consequently the NAFTA will not affect the 
movement of natural gas across borders. 
Mexico, like Canada, may liberalize its restric-
tions on foreign investment and thereby 
increase North American participation, 
although this liberalization is not written into 
the NAFTA. 
Petrochemicals, the Biggest Money 
Makers 
Petrochemicals, those substances formed 
directly or indirectly from crude petroleum, dif-
fer from chemicals, which can be derived from 
crude petroleum and other types of primary 
materials. Because the petrochemical and 
chemical industries are a major focal point for 
the negotiations, the discussion below will 
include an in-depth look at each country's 
capacities, policies, and expectations with the 
implementation of the NAFTA. 
Trilateral Capacities 
The U.S. maintains a trade deficit in ener-
gy products, being a net importer of crude 
petroleum. In 1989 the largest sources of U.S. 
imports of crude petroleum included Mexico, 
Canada, Saudi Arabia and other OPEC nations. 
As of January 1, 1990, the U.S. had estimated 
proven reserves of 25.9 billion barrels of crude 
petroleum (less than half of Mexico's), and pro-
duced 7.8 million barrels per day. Despite its 
lack of reserves vis-a-vis other energy rich 
countries, the U.S. historically has been a leader 
in the development of new technology in the 
petroleum industry. (USITC 2353, p. 4-29) The 
U.S. is the world's largest producer of petro-
chemicals, and its petroleum industry includes 
large multinational petroleum companies, large 
domestic firms, and smaller independent 
refineries. (USITC 2353, p. 4-23) In 1989 there 
were 188 U.S. refineries in operation, with the 
capacity to refine 16.2 million barrels of crude 
petroleum per day. (USITC 2353, p. 4-29) 
In 1991 the U.S. total trade surplus in the 
chemical industry reached a record $ 20 billion. 
(Anderson, p. 8) The chemical industry is one 
of the largest in the U.S., directly employing an 
estimated 820,000 people in more than 12,000 
plants. Significant restructuring took place 
during the mid-1980s and enabled the industry 
to remain the world's leader in process and 
product technology and a major supplier in 
markets both at home and abroad. The indus-
try supplies more than ninety percent of all 
domestic consumption. (USITC 2353, p. 4-24) 
In addition, Canada receives the largest portion 
of the U.S.'s chemical exports, and (after Japan) 
Mexico is the third largest market. (USITC 
2353, p. 4-24) 
Mexico's petrochemical industry is the fif-
teenth largest in the world and accounted for 
three percent of world production and 2.5 per-
cent of Mexican GDP in 1989. (Hufbauer and 
Schott, p. 193) Pemex owns nine refineries and 
twenty-one basic petrochemical complexes that 
employed approximately 175,000 people as of 
1991. Until a U.S. policy change in 1989, Mexico 
had supplied nearly half of the crude petroleum 
stored in the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve. 
Even with the loss of this account, the U.S. is 
still Mexico's major oil trading partner, account-
ing for sixty percent of Mexican exports of crude 
petroleum in 1989. (USITC 2353, p. 4-30) 
Mexico's estimated proven reserves of 
crude petroleum as of January 1, 1990, were 
56.4 billion barrels, making its oil reserves the 
fifth largest in the world. However, Mexico 
lacks storage facilities, which impedes timely 
extraction. It hopes to overcome this obstacle 
by constructing many new underground stor-
age facilities. In addition, only seven of its nine 
refineries are operating. Because of this poor-
ly integrated system, the seven refineries are 
running at over-capacity levels, and Mexico has 
a trade deficit in refined petroleum products. 
(Annual Petroleum Report, p. 15) Mexico's 
petroleum industry, like most government 
owned industries, needs large amounts of 
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investment capital in order to modernize and 
bring production facilities up to world compe-
tition levels. Because of the condition of 
Mexico's petrochemical industry, the U.S. cur-
rently satisfies nearly fifty percent of Mexico's 
demand for refined petroleum products. (USITC 
2353, p. 4-29) 
Unfortunately, administrative corruption 
in the form of payoffs, embezzlement, extortion, 
and almost all other forms of graft causes devel-
opment to lag. Even though it has made 
progress in ridding itself of graft, Pemex is still 
one of the world's least efficiently run energy 
companies. (Hufbauer and Schott, p. 185) In 
order for its petroleum industry to achieve its 
goals of self-sufficiency and competition, 
Mexico needs to complete construction of twen-
ty-one petrochemical plants that have been 
planned for over ten years. According to a U.S. 
General Accounting Office report, Mexico needs 
six to twelve billion dollars in investments by 
1995 in order to avoid incurring large trade 
deficits in basic petrochemicals. (GA0-91-212, 
p. 2) This money will be used to increase pro-
duction of both oil and natural gas and to alter 
consumption from gasoline to electricity and 
natural gas. Even if all planned plants could be 
built immediately, the Mexican chemical indus-
try would still face the transportation infra-
structure problems that affect its ability to 
deliver products on a timely and dependable 
basis. (USITC 2353, p. 4-25) 
Current Policy and Activity 
Mexico employs a classification system 
which determines whether or not foreign 
investment is allowed for a given petrochemi-
cal. It classifies all oil products as belonging to 
one of three types: basic, secondary, and ter-
tiary. Those chemicals that result from the first 
chemical or physical transformation of crude 
petroleum and natural gas are called basic 
petrochemicals. They include ethylene, propy-
lene, and benzene, and their production is 
closed to any kind of foreign investment. 
Secondary petrochemicals are usually second 
derivatives of crude petroleum although they 
can also be made directly from the feed stocks 
generated by crude petroleum and natural gas. 
These petrochemicals include ethylene oxide, 
polypropylene, ethyl benzene, and styrene. 
Secondary petrochemical industries are open 
to forty percent foreign investment. The ter-
tiary products, which include everything not 
classified as basic or secondary, include 
antifreeze, polyester, molded plastics, poly-
styrene, and synthetic rubber. The tertiary 
industries have no restrictions on foreign 
investment and are not subjected to permit 
requirements. (USITC 2275, p. 5-10) 
Because Mexico cannot supply its domes-
tic demand for capital, it has liberalized the raw 
material sector in an effort to entice more for-
eign investment. For example, Mexico has 
decreased the number of products classified as 
basic and secondary petrochemicals. In the 
1986 Petroleum Development Plan, thirty-six 
products were reclassified from basic to sec-
ondary, leaving thirty-four basic petrochemi-
cals. In 1989 that number was reduced to nine-
teen. Although the number has fluctuated with 
the addition of new products, as of 1991 it was 
back at nineteen. At the same time, the 
Mexican government reduced the number of 
secondary petrochemicals from 700 to 66, and 
for the first time distributed a definitive listing 
of the chemicals that were classified. In spite of 
all of the nationalistic sentiment toward the 
industry, Mexico has taken several other steps 
to entice foreign investors. Mexico will grant 
foreign investors full ownership of secondary 
petrochemical plants if they establish a special 
trust with a Mexican credit institution. Under 
the trust, the investor would receive the prof-
its, but the direct control of the company would 
remain with the trustee. Pemex also created an 
incentive for foreign construction companies 
in its basic petrochemical plants. Mexico would 
pay companies to construct plants by giving 
them petrochemical products generated at the 
plant. Pemex would supervise the construction 
of the plant, and, upon completion, maintain 
and run it. Because of the hands-off nature of 
these deals, they are not considered to be an 
investment in basic petrochemicals. Another 
way in which Mexico is trying to entice invest-
ment is by reducing regulation delays by set-
ting a time limit of forty-five days for the proc-
essing of petrochemical production permits. 
In an effort to help Mexico, the U.S. Trade 
and Development Program has funded a feasi-
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bility study to upgrade two petrochemical 
plants. Also, the U.S. Export-Import Bank has 
agreed to provide loan guarantees for large pur-
chases of U.S. oil and gas equipment and relat-
ed services. (GAO/T-GGD-92-24, Summary) In 
addition, the Department of Energy has held 
bilateral consultations with its Mexican coun-
terpart since 1982 to enhance energy coopera-
tion. (GAO/T-GGD-92-24, Summary) Like the 
U.S., countries such as Germany and Japan are 
aiding the processes of reform and change in 
the petroleum industry in Mexico with invest-
ments and technology programs. (U.S. Em-
bassy, 1992) 
Trade between Canada and Mexico still 
remains minimal, however. Mexico ships small 
amounts of crude petroleum via tanker to 
Canada, and Canada has several medium-sized 
oil companies which could benefit by service 
contracts and the new availability of raw mate-
rials and investments in Mexico. Oil service 
contracting companies provide services such as 
well drilling, maintenance, and transportation. 
But the distance between the two countries and 
the lack of efficient infrastructure preclude the 
prospects for substantially increased petroleum 
trade. 
Although the U.S. has a ban on exports of 
crude oil, it currently exports to Canada under 
a special trade agreement whereby U.S. exports 
of crude petroleum are exchanged for imports 
of refined petroleum products. (US lTC 2353, p 
4-30) A similar agreement could be reached 
with Mexico; but because Mexico's refineries are 
currently producing at full capacity, it is unlike-
ly that they could handle any additional refin-
ing of imported crude oil or natural gas. 
Expectations From NAFTA 
If the NAFTA is enacted, the petrochemi-
cal industries of Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. 
would prosper because they complement each 
other. The U.S. and Canada have large amounts 
of industrial infrastructure, capital, and tech-
nology but decreasing supplies of natural 
resources. Mexico has abundant natural 
resources but is deficient in technology and 
capital. If Mexico were to open its doors to 
more foreign investment, U.S. and Canadian 
firms could improve Mexico's petroleum indus-
try while creating jobs and revenue for 
Americans and Canadians, too. In the near 
future, U.S. companies will be decreasing 
domestic production of basic petrochemicals 
and expanding their production of more valu-
able finished petrochemical products. (GAO/ 
NSIAD-91-212, p. 7) With Mexico as a source 
of lower-priced raw materials, this expansion 
will be more effective. Also, Mexico could 
expand its production of basic petrochemicals 
(keeping within its constitutional concerns) to 
accommodate needs in the trilateral region. 
Under the NAFTA, the number of petrochemi-
cals classified as basic will be reduced from nine-
teen to five, and firms will assume complete 
ownership positions over time in companies 
producing secondary petrochemicals. (Mexico: 
Foreign Investment Report, p. 9) As an added 
benefit, except for basic petrochemicals no 
import or export licenses will be required. 
(Mexico: Foreign Investment Report, p. 40) 
Chemical industry spokespersons have indicat-
ed that the U.S. chemical industry would sup-
port the NAFTA if U.S. negotiators could get 
secured access to feedstocks (used as raw mate-
rials in plants) and a significant reduction in the 
restricted petrochemical lists. (Anderson, p. 9) 
Besides the direct involvement with chem-
icals, another benefit of the NAFTA is the oppor-
tunity for U.S. industries to participate in the 
exploration and recovery of natural resources. 
Currently taxes on these services can be as high 
as thirty-three percent, and Pemex gives prefer-
ence to Mexican-owned companies over foreign 
companies. (GAO/T-GDD-92-24, p. 3) If these 
barriers were dropped, the U.S. would increase 
its activity in the oil service sector. According to 
virtually all of the thirty U.S. oil service con-
tractors interviewed by the General Accounting 
Office (GAO/T-GGD-92-24, p. 3), contracts in 
Mexico would help compensate for declining oil 
service business in the U.S. A contract with 
Triton Engineering of Houston, Texas, is a case 
in point. Triton drilled a well under a service con-
tract for Pemex in 127 days, compared to 249 for 
a similar well drilled by Pemex employees. 
(Annual Petroleum Report, Executive Summary) 
Most of the U.S. oil service contractors said that 
in a fair market they would have a competitive 
edge in Mexico, and that Mexico offers strong 
prospects as a long-term market. (GAO/T-GDD-
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92-24, p. 3) Under the NAFTA, each country will 
allow its states or other governing enterprises to 
negotiate performance clauses in their service 
contracts. (Mexico: Foreign Investment Report, 
p. 40) This will increase interest in and compe-
tition for contracts. 
Increased activity in service contracts 
would increase the U.S. chemical industry's rev-
enue. In addition to service contracts, many 
companies would like to see the availability of 
risk contracts. A risk contract is one in which 
a foreign firm tries to extract a natural resource, 
and, if successful, gets a percentage of the rev-
enues created by that resource. If the compa-
ny is unsuccessful, it assumes some of the 
financial burden. But because president Salinas 
believes that "risk contracts are nothing but a 
disguised sale of petroleum reserves" (Annual 
Petroleum Report, p. 4), it is highly unlikely 
that any such contracts will be awarded in the 
near future. According to the U.S. chemical 
industry, the pivotal issue on petrochemicals 
may not be so much one of ownership of facil-
ities and subsoil rights, but of access. U.S. com-
panies, along with other companies operating 
in Mexico, need secure, reliable, and sufficient 
access to petrochemical feedstocks at nondis-
criminatory world market prices. 
The U.S. petrochemical industry would 
like to see Mexico liberalize its policy to allow 
the private sector, including foreign companies, 
to produce petrochemicals, starting with ethyl-
ene and propylene and continuing down the 
petrochemical chain. According to one chem-
ical expert in the NAFTA negotiations, 
"Liberalizing the marketplace would satisfy the 
big U.S. petrochemical producers, help the 
Mexican chemical industry at the same time, 
and send a signal to the others that Mexico is 
serious about an open-market system." 
(Anderson, p. 9) The chemical industry also 
wants the NAFTA to provide protection for intel-
lectual property rights. This protection would 
include comprehensive product and process 
patent coverage and a minimum of compulso-
ry licensing. (Anderson, p. 12) With increased 
protection, all parties in the agreement will have 
more confidence in creating and signing new 
contracts, thereby creating more interaction 
and revenue for all. The U.S. industry stands to 
lose out on the smaller batch-type product lines, 
but it is supportive of the NAFTA on the whole 
because of the guarantees of fair competition in 
the Mexican market. In addition, though it is 
not likely in the near future, it is possible that 
Pemex could open service stations in the U.S. 
This would increase competition between the 
oil companies and benefit consumers. 
Current U.S. duties on crude petroleum 
and refined petroleum products are minimal: 
0.5 percent and 1.1 percent, respectively. In 
addition, more than forty percent of the chem-
icals that the U.S. imports from Mexico come 
into the country duty-free under the 
Generalized System of Preferences. (Anderson, 
p. 10) A reduction in existing tariffs would have 
a negligible effect on the demand for domestic 
petroleum products in the U.S. (Hufbauer and 
Schott, p. 198) In contrast, the tariffs on petro-
chemical imports to Mexico are approximately 
fifteen percent. This figure is significant, but 
because of the relative size of the U.S. industry 
in comparison to Mexico's, exports to Mexico 
would probably rise only slightly in response to 
the elimination of Mexico's duties. (USITC 
2353, p. 4-25) Owing to the large size of the 
U.S. industry and the relatively small share of 
U.S. trade and consumption accounted for by 
Mexico, it is expected that the NAFTA will not 
have a large effect on Mexican petrochemical 
imports in either the short or long term. 
(USITC 2353, p. 4-25) The only possible effects 
might be felt in Texas and Louisiana (areas 
experiencing declines in employment and rev-
enues in the petroleum sector), where most of 
the imports of Mexican energy products enter 
and are marketed. (USITC 2353, p. 4-30) 
Although the U.S. industry is more 
advanced and efficient, Mexican companies are 
perceived as having a comparative advantage in 
the products produced in small, labor-intensive, 
batch-type processes. (Anderson, p. 11) Thus, 
the U.S. and Mexico have strengths and weak-
nesses that will make the NAFTA advantageous 
to both parties. 
Conclusion 
Both the Mexican private sector and the 
government are in favor of the NAFTA. 
President Salinas sees the importance of indus-
trial growth for his country. The energy sector, 
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traditionally seen as Mexico's ticket out of the 
Third World, is in dire need of financial and 
technological support. Even though the trade 
in energy and petrochemicals is already sub-
stantial, the continuing success of this rela-
tionship relies on the policies of future presi-
dents. A NAFTA will lock in Salinas ' policy 
reforms for the future and help create a more 
stable and efficient economy now. The NAFTA 
represents a major milestone in Mexico's future 
financial stability and success. If the NAFTA 
passes, the effect on Mexico's smaller economy 
will be much more pronounced than on that of 
the U.S. 
The NAFTA would likely have a negligible 
impact on U.S. trade with Canada and other 
countries. An increase in U.S. exports of even 
moderate proportions would not significantly 
reduce U.S. supplies of products available for 
export to other markets. (USITC 2353, p. 4-25) 
The major impediment to increased interaction 
between the U.S. and Mexican petrochemical 
industries is the basic chemical classification 
list. Besides the government monopoly on elec-
tricity and basic petrochemical exploitation, the 
infrastructure in Mexico is a major deterrent to 
foreign involvement. Many facilities and trans-
portation routes are substandard and require 
extra effort by foreign companies to gain 
entrance to actual sites. The privatization of 
several hundred firms and the addition of new 
multinational firms as a result of the NAFTA 
will increase the demand for efficient and con-
sistent infrastructure systems. The result of 
this liberalization will be increased investments 
in all of Mexico's infrastructure, from phone 
lines to railways. 
The natural gas and electricity industries 
in both Mexico and the U.S. are already becom-
ing more liberalized. The electricity sector in 
Mexico has been drastically opened to foreign 
investment, and few if any trade barriers exist 
for the trade of natural gas between the two. 
The involvement of Canada's electric and nat-
ural gas industries with Mexico will be limited 
because of the geographic distance, and 
Canada's relationship with the U.S. will not 
change by adding Mexico to the FTA. 
Signing the NAFTA would create a region 
with a total chemical trade of almost $145 bil-
lion. (Anderson, p. 7) U.S. and Canadian petro-
chemical industries want Mexico to allow the 
private sector, including foreign companies, to 
produce petrochemicals. The NAFTA could 
simultaneously help out all three countries' 
petrochemical industries in the event that 
Mexico relaxes its foreign investment policy. 
Decreased foreign investment barriers in 
Mexico will provide its petrochemical industry 
with the capital needed to avoid a projected 
trade deficit in basic petrochemicals of $8.6 bil-
lion by 1995. (GAO/NSIAD-91-212, p. 3) 
Overall the NAFTA will improve the 
Mexican, U.S., and Canadian energy sectors. 
Increases in trade and investment along with 
decreases in tariffs will save energy because of 
improved efficiency, infrastructure, and com-
merce. In addition to decreasing waste, the 
NAFTA will lower energy costs for all in the tri-
lateral area. 
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